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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
prosecute. At that time, no appeal could be had from a denial of defendant's
request to have his conviction reviewed in forma pauperis.6 3 Eight years later
defendant's first conviction was vacated. Consequently, defendant appealed for
resentencing as a first offender. In conjunction with this appeal defendant also
64
applied for a review of the merits of his 1948 conviction.
65
In 1959, the Court of Appeals, in People v. Pitts, held that the denial of
an appeal in a criminal action because the defendant is unable to pay the costs
of his appeal, is a denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.66
People v. Williams,67 a companion case to People v. Pitts, held that the
defendant could no longer procure a review on the merits of his 1948 conviction
because his request was untimely. 68 However, in view of the Pitts decision, the
defendant should now have the privilege which was unavailable to him at the
time of his conviction, i.e., to show that the refusal to allow his appeal in form
pauperis--"which led to the later dismissal of the appeal, deprived him of a
'right' to appeal and constituted a denial of the equal protection of the law." 69
The Court's decision may enable the defendant, if the constitutional
question is decided in his favor, to gain review of the merits of his 1948 conviction. This result seems equitable in view of the possibility that the defendant
may have served a sentence for over ten years which, had he been able to
afford to appeal, might never have been imposed.

CORPORATIONS
POWER OF CORPORATION PRESIDENT TO BRING

SUIT ON BEHALF

OF THE

CORPORATION

In the case of West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.,' three men
owned all of the plaintiff's stock, and also constituted its board of directors,
with one of them being its president as well. The remaining two owned all of
the defendant's stock, the president of the plaintiff having sold his interest in
the defendant (along with some nine other corporations) to the other two.
Without any meeting or other authorization of the board of the plaintiff, its
president instituted suit against the defendant, in the name of the plaintiff,
to recover amounts which it was allegedly wrongfully required to pay to the
defendant, for a building which the latter had built for the former. The
remaining two directors of the plaintiff, the complete owners of the defendant,
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Supra note 63.
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6 N.Y.2d 193, 196, 189 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (1959).
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moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied by the Supreme Court
at Special Term, and both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals
affirmed this denial.
In the United States generally, very little statutory guidance exists as
to the authority of corporate officers. The most relevant provision in New
York is probably Section 27 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, which
provides, "The business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors... ," and this provision is of little assistance. This lack of statutory
guidance has caused the courts to resort to agency concepts of actual, apparent
and implied authority. If actual authority is found, there is no problem. But
when does apparent or implied authority exist to allow the president to
institute suits in the name of the corporation? This is the issue in the present
case.2
This question has been answered in various ways. Generally, the presidential power to instftute suits is not implied in the absence of authorization
by the board of directors.8 Some prominent authorities, however, have pointed
to at least three types of exceptional or serious circumstances where such
authority could be implied without the sanction of the board. 4 The first such
circumstance arises when, in order to preserve the corporate interests, a, suit
must be instituted.5 This class of cases has generally required that the threat
to the corporation, either by the board itself or from outside the corporation,
be quite serious. 6
As the New York case of Sterling Ind. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.1 pointed
out, however, when the board is deadlocked as to whether to institute suit, and
the by-laws require board authorization, this is not a sufficient ground for the
president to institute suit on his own initiative. By similar reasoning, it appears
unlikely that the situation in the West Hills case is grave enough to warrant
the employment of the "preservation of corporate interests" exception as a
ground for implying presidential authority to institute suit. For as the dissent
noted, when there are only three stockholders and two of them oppose the
suit, whose interests, other than those of the outvoted shareholder, are being
protected?
The second exceptional instance when such authority may be implied
arises in those cases where the management and control of the corporation has
been vested in the president.8 For instance, in Rothinan & Schneider Inc. v.
2. Bank presidents are in a peculiar position because of the nature of their duties, and
this discussion has no reference to them.
3. Note, 52 HARVaRD L. RFv. 322 (1938).
4. Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 701, 707 (1950). This note offers an informative discussion
of authority of corporation presidents to institute suit in the absence of authorization

by the board of directors.
S. Ibid.

6. Recamier Mfg. Co. v. Seymour, 15 Daly (N.Y.) 245, 5 N.Y.S. 648 (C.P.N.Y. City,
1889). When a majority of the board was wrongfully converting corporate funds, the
president was permitted to bring suit.
7. 289 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E. 790 (1949).

8. Suprra note 4, at 708.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM

Beckerman,9 a New York case, Rothman and Schneider agreed to dissolve the
corporation, and to place full control of the corporation's affairs in Schneider
in the interim period. The Court of Appeals, after an express acknowledgment
of this placement of control, then stated the holding relied on by the court
in the present case, namely, "Where there has been no direct prohibition by
the Board... the president has presumptive authority ...to ...prosecute
suits in the name of the corporation." 10 In the present case, however, there
was no such placement of control in the president, and therefore, the validity
of the reliance, by the Court, on the holding of the Rothman case appears
difficult to justify:
The third instance in which presidential authority to institute suits may
be implied, arises when the president has been charged with special duties,"which by their nature, virtually require the institution of court proceedings,
such as to dispose of corporate property,' 2 this being practically impossible
without implied authority to try the title thereto. Obviously, the West Hills
case does not meet this criterion.
This discussion does not mean to imply that these are the only three
instances in which such presidential authority may be implied. However,
these authoritative groupings, along with Section 27 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, do tend to show that such authority will and should be
implied only when the circumstances of the corporation are either very grave
or quite exceptional. However, in the present case, the fact that the president
was opposed by the other two stockholders appears to present circumstances
which are neither grave nor exceptional. Therefore the dissent by two of the
Justices seems to be more accurate than the decision of the majority.
ARBITRATION AS AN INCIDENT OF WINDING UP

A written agreement between a contractor and a corporate sub-contractor,
contained a provision providing for the arbitration of all disputes arising thereunder. The contract also contained a clause prohibiting the sub-contractor
from subletting, assigning or otherwise transferring the contract without the
contractor's prior consent. This latter clause was to be non-arbitrable.
The Court in Ehrlich v. Unit Frame and Door Co.,' 3 was confronted with
a question as to whether the voluntary dissolution of the corporate subcontractor, precluded such corporation from demanding arbitration. Ehrlich
claimed, on a motion to stay arbitration, that such dissolution and distribution
of the contract to the corporate shareholders for completion, without Ehrlich's
consent, was a breach of the non-assignability clause, and that Unit Frame
had thus lost its arbitration right.
9. 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
10. Id., at 497, 161 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1957).

11. Supra note 4, at 710.
12. New York B.&E.R.R. Co. v. Motil, 81 Conn. 466, 71 A. 563 (1908).
13. 5 N.Y.2d 275, 184 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1959).
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